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Date:
12
/
22
/2009
The Latest
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Failure in Copenhagen
Uncertainty persists after climate negotiations falter; illusion that ‘great reforms were probable overshadowed practical possibilities,’ reports Richard O. Faulk.
The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference has ended. For two weeks, the United Nations and its member nations struggled on the “World Stage” of Copenhagen’s Bella Center. From the beginning, few informed attendees expected significant progress. In the end, the conference fulfilled those expectations by delivering no legally binding agreements. Considering the effort. Cost and political capital spent pursuing elusive commitments, many terms can be used to describe the convocation – but “successful” is not one of them. At least four reasons underlie its failure.
First, the conference relied too strongly on the politics of perception – presenting an illusion that great reforms were probable – as opposed to practical possibilities. Although it was known from the beginning that it was virtually impossible to secure a legally binding agreement, the UN raised expectations unrealistically. As a result, many participants developed false hopes – only to see those hopes dashed when the conference inevitably failed. Insofar as real relief is concerned, the climate change movement is no better off than it would have been if the conference had never occurred.
Second, although the conference professed to be concerned about the “most vulnerable” nations affected by climate change, it ultimately did nothing to assist them. Agreements regarding those nations were “low hanging fruit” that might have been obtained, bypassing those hardships was a huge mistake, both morally and politically. By doing so, the larger powers demonstrated that their motives were primarily nationalistic and narrowly focused. This led to combative confrontations that poisoned the negotiating process, distanced compassion and empathy from the proceedings, and sacrificed the conference’s moral imperative.
Third, the conferees failed to deal effectively with opposing political and economic systems, particularly regarding the United States and China, but also regarding ambitious and emerging states generally. The conflict between an “open” society, such as the United States, which understands democratic transparency and verification, and a “closed” society, such as China, which governs more opaquely, is a fundamental obstacle. Without comparable transparency between negotiating partners, it is unrealistic to expect meaningful compromises. Until practical verification procedures are adopted to guarantee accountability, no meaningful treaty is possible.
Finally, the environmental movement’s tendency to include virtually all social and business issues in its agenda, has transformed the movement’s goals into primarily political and economic objectives, as opposed to scientific or moral concerns. The Copenhagen conference resembled a global political convention for the environmental movement, which used the event to display its organizational power, but failed to accomplish its substantive goals. More progress would have been made if the movement had concentrated on core messages of scientific validity, humanitarian concern, and practical relief. By attempting to satisfy everyone, the conference ended up delivering nothing.
One is tempted to compare the event to the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago – a “watershed” event for an entire generation, characterized by clashes between the forces of traditional dominance and idealistic activism. As that historic convention plunged to a disastrous, embarrassing and predictable conclusion, so the Copenhagen conference, despite its glitter, publicity and enthusiasm, demonstrated the triumph of practical nationalism over international idealism and naiveté. In Copenhagen, as in Chicago, the “whole world” was watching the events unfold, expecting a serious and dramatic dénouement. Like the Democratic Party in Chicago, the climate change movement in Copenhagen proved incapable of coordinating its constituencies to achieve meaningful reforms. After all of the political and financial capital expended in Copenhagen, one wonders whether the nations of the world will ever allow themselves to be drawn to such an illusory opportunity again.
Under the circumstances, American industry faces great challenges and, thanks to Copenhagen’s impasse, limited opportunities. Despite the burdens that a climate change treaty will impose, a rational treaty is probably preferable to the confusion engendered by the current situation. Indeed, most industry leaders believe that certainty and predictability in rights and obligations should be the goal of any international change accord, and climate change is no exception. Predictability is sacrificed, however, when the law fails to provide such guidance or, at the worst, permits uncertainties to be exploited through litigation or bargaining imbalances. The lack of uniform standards complicates negotiations, increases transaction costs, and multiplies the risks associated with doing business internationally.
Without a useful treaty, nations are forced to deal with climate change unilaterally through statutes and regulations. In the United States, pending legislation in Congress, and proposed EPA regulations, propose to limit emissions substantially – even if competitors such as China and India do nothing to change their operations. As a result, American businesses will face increased costs for production and compliance, resulting in major competitive disadvantages.
Although many enterprises are already participating in carbon trading markets in Europe or regional systems in the United States, the absence of an international system that includes projects in all nations inhibits investment everywhere. Although financing sources, such as the World Bank, are actively involved in climate projects, their commitment to those ventures remains tentative because the price of carbon cannot be predicted after the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. Unless a new treaty is effective by then, the profitable trading markets prophesied by climate change advocates may be compromised.
Despite these concerns, some hope remains. For the first time, all nations have agreed to provide targets for emission reductions. Those targets and the resulting reductions, if they can be verified, may prevent excessive warming. The developed countries have also agreed to discuss binding commitments to finance climate change responses in poorer nations. These ideas, however nebulous they may be, may ultimately grow into a significant treaty. More immediately, they may persuade a few wavering Congress members debating climate legislation that China and others are serious about cooperating – even without binding agreements.
Now that Copenhagen’s drama has ended, perhaps these conciliations will allow climate change to be analyzed and debated practically. It is unlikely, however, that the Copenhagen conference will produce a sequel. If anything is to follow, the disappointing performance of the original version demonstrates the necessity of a remake – from a substantially more practical and cooperative script.
Richard Faulk chairs the Litigation Department, Environmental Practice Group, and Climate Change Task Force of Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP with offices in Dallas, Houston, Austin and Mexico City. He was a credentialed attendee of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark. The opinions stated herein are solely those of the author. (Copyright 2009. All rights reserved.)
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